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Ruwe: The Functional Approach to the Ministerial Exception

THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: APPLYING THE
EXCEPTION TO EMPLOYEES WHO MINISTER
Maria Ruwe

I. INTRODUCTION
The right to religious freedom is widely endorsed throughout the
United States. One way that religious freedom is protected is through a
constitutional doctrine called the “ministerial exception.” The ministerial
exception allows religious organizations to hire and fire their employees
who qualify as “ministers” without abiding by antidiscrimination laws.1
The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in 2012. 2 In so
holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional legitimacy of the
ministerial exception. However, the Supreme Court did not offer a brightline test that lower courts could apply when classifying religious
organizations’ employees. As a result of the Supreme Court’s narrow and
undefined holding, the circuit courts have been inconsistent in their
application of the ministerial exception.
This Article will explain the origin and parameters of the ministerial
exception, describe the Supreme Court’s approach in applying the
exception, discuss some of the circuit courts’ inconsistencies regarding
the exception, and specify why courts should use a functional approach
when classifying the employees of religious organizations. First, Section
II of this Article will provide the background of the ministerial exception,
including a summary of the courts’ creation and development of the
exception. Next, Section III will explain why both the approach and
conclusion in Biel v. St. James Catholic School3 were inaccurate. Section
III will continue with an explanation about why courts should use a
functional approach when classifying employees of religious
organizations. Finally, Section IV will conclude by touching on the
possible consequences that might result from future courts applying the
functional approach to the ministerial exception.
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
1. Michael J. West, Note, Waiving the Ministerial Exception, 103 VA. L. REV. 1861, 1864-65
(2017).
2. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
3. 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018).
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”4 Generally, the First Amendment
provides religious organizations with the “power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine.”5 Simply put, the government may not
regulate religious beliefs.6 The ministerial exception is a constitutional
doctrine that bars religious “ministers” from bringing employment
discrimination claims against the religious organizations that employ
them.7 This exception is rooted in the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.8
This Section will first explain the constitutional basis for the ministerial
exception. Next, this Section addresses the origin of the ministerial
exception in the courts and the Supreme Court’s application of the
exception. Finally, this Section concludes with an analysis of how some
federal circuit courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s application of
the ministerial exception.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from singling out
areligious organization for adverse treatment.9 This constitutional clause
gives individuals the right to worship how they want without fearing
governmental intervention.10 In the context of the ministerial exception,
the Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause protects a
religious organization’s right to “shape its own faith and mission through
its appointments.”11 Further, the Court has noted that a religious
organization’s freedom to select its clergy receives constitutional
protection due to a religious organization’s freedom to exercise its
religion without state interference.12 Indeed, a religious organization must
be free to choose its ministers using any criteria that it wants.13
The Free Exercise Clause reserves “special solicitude” for the churchminister relationship.14 A religious organization’s choice about who

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of The Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
6. Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944 (1986).
7. West, supra note 1, at 1864-65.
8. Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1776 (2008).
9. Choper, supra note 6, at 956.
10. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 755, 756 (2001).
11. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
12. Note, supra note 8, at 1780.
13. West, supra note 1, at 1900.
14. Note, supra note 8, at 1776.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/8

2

Ruwe: The Functional Approach to the Ministerial Exception

2020] THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

207

qualifies as a minister is a “unique distillation of a belief system.”15
Regulating the choice of who may serve as a religious organization’s
minister comes perilously close to regulating belief, which is strictly
forbidden by Free Exercise rights.16
B. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause prevents Congress from enacting any law
“respecting an establishment of religion.”17 The purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to prevent the government from promoting or
discouraging religious worship or belief18 and from entangling itself with
religion.19
The Establishment Clause has been interpreted in two ways.20 First, the
provision may be construed as a structural restraint on the government’s
power to legislate in the religious realm.21 Under this reading, the
Establishment Clause is analogous to a physical wall that separates the
church and the State.22 In other words, the church and State are two
completely distinct sovereigns, and the government simply may not
legislate in this area.23
Second, the Establishment Clause may be interpreted as protecting the
liberty of conscience.24 Under this interpretation, the provision prohibits
governmental involvement in ecclesiastical decisions so as to prevent the
government’s judgment from replacing the religious organization’s
decisions.25 This interpretation holds that a religious organization must
have independence and freedom over its internal, religious choices.26
C. Antidiscrimination Laws in Employment
The Americans with Disabilities Act,27 the Age Discrimination in

15. Id. at 1780.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. West, supra note 1, at 1895.
19. Russell W. Galloway, Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845,
845 (1989).
20. West, supra note 1, at 1869.
21. Id.
22. Galloway, supra note 19, at 845.
23. West, supra note 1, at 1869-70.
24. Id. at 1869.
25. Id. at 1894.
26. Id. at 1868-69.
27. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2020) (protects
individuals who suffer from long-term physical or mental disabilities from discrimination based on
disability).
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Employment Act,28 and the Family Medical Leave Act29 are examples of
some federal employment and antidiscrimination laws that affect
employers.30 In addition, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.31 However, Title VII does permit a religious
employer to prefer members of its own faith for employment, but leaves
the employer liable for discriminating based on other protected
classifications.32
D. The Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception encompasses the collision of religious liberty
and employment antidiscrimination laws.33 The exception allows
religious employers to hire and fire their ministerial employees without
abiding by antidiscrimination laws.34 For the ministerial exception to
apply, two conditions must be met: (1) the employer must be a religious
organization and (2) the employee at issue must be a ministerial
employee.35 When religious employers discriminate based on a
classification protected by federal law, the interests between religious
freedom and civil rights clash.36 When this happens, courts generally
apply strict scrutiny37 to the antidiscrimination law, weighing the
religious organization’s38 interest in the unburdened selection of its
spiritual leaders against the government’s interest in enforcing
antidiscrimination laws.39 However, even though courts have recognized

28. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2020) (protects
individuals over the age of forty from discrimination based on age).
29. See Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2020) (enables individuals
to take leave after the birth or adoption of a child, to care for the health of an immediate family member,
or to care for their own health).
30. Overview of Employment and Anti-Discrimination Laws, FINDLAW (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://employment.findlaw.com/employment-discrimination/overview-of-employment-and-antidiscrimination-laws.html.
31. Note, supra note 8, at 1777.
32. Id. at 1777-78.
33. Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2011).
34. West, supra note 1, at 1864-65.
35. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007).
36. Note, supra note 8, at 1776.
37. “Strict scrutiny” requires the state to show “a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates
the law in question.” Strict Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
38. There is no precise definition for what constitutes a “religious organization.” Previously, in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the Supreme Court denied the distinction
made by the NLRB between organizations that are “completely religious” and those that are merely
“religiously associated.” See Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of HosannaTabor v. EEOC Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer Jurisprudence, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 444 (2014).
39. Note, supra note 8, at 1780.
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the vital importance of preventing workplace discrimination, courts
routinely place the protection of religious freedom over the prevention of
an infringement on civil rights.40 Religious employers may affirmatively
defend against a discrimination employment action by invoking the
ministerial exception.41
The ministerial exception was first formally recognized in McClure v.
Salvation Army.42 After the Salvation Army terminated a female
employee, she sued, alleging a violation of Title VII. 43 Neither party
disputed that the employee, who was an ordained minister of the faith,
was a “minister engaged in the religious or ecclesiastical activities of the
church.”44 The court therefore found that the employee could be
terminated for any reason without violating Title VII because Congress
never intended to regulate the employment relationship between a
religious organization and its ministers.45 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
noted: “The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is
its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”46
In 1985, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,
the Fourth Circuit also recognized the ministerial exception.47 Rooting the
exception in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the court
extended the ministerial exception to an employee who was not an
ordained minister, but was an “associate in pastoral care” at a church.48
The court held that the ministerial exception does not depend on the
employee’s ordination, but rather on the employee’s function.49 In this
case, the employee was “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of
the church” and performed duties that consisted of “teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
40. Id. at 1780-81. See also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (“While an unfettered church choice might create minimal infidelity to the
objectives of Title VII, it provides maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise
of religious beliefs”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (holding
that some religious interests are so important that no compelling state interest can justify the government
intrusion); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“In the absence of fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical,
although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because
the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.”).
41. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,195 n.4 (2012).
42. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 555.
44. Id. at 556.
45. Id. at 560-61.
46. Id. at 558-59.
47. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 1168-70.
49. Id. at 1168-69.
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supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.”50 Therefore,
the court classified the employee as a minister for the purposes of the
exception.51 The Rayburn court also noted that an inquiry into whether
the employee’s position is important to the mission of the religious
organization is necessary, but a court may not investigate into whether the
reason for the adverse employment action was grounded in theological
belief.52
Courts continued to expand the ministerial exception, applying it to
most class-based protections under Title VII,53 other federal employment
discrimination statutes, and some state law claims—such as defamation
and breach of contract.54 In such cases, the courts held that the exception
applies to any claim by a ministerial employee where a court would have
to resolve specifically religious questions about an employee’s
performance in an employment position.55 In coming to these
conclusions, courts have defined “ministers” as employees who perform
significant religious duties for their religious organization employers.56
The Fifth Circuit defined what generally constitutes religious duties:
Generally, “if the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order,
or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she
should be considered ‘clergy.’”57
1. Reason Behind the Adverse Employment Action
If a religious organization’s employee can be classified as a minister,
courts may not inquire into the reason behind the adverse employment
decision.58 The rationale behind this principle is that religious
organizations need the freedom to choose who will preach their beliefs,
convey their faith, and carry out their mission.59 Such an inquiry would
require a court to judge a religious organization’s doctrines, which could

50. Id. at 1168-69.
51. Id. at 1169.
52. Id.
53. Courts have never applied the ministerial exception to claims related to sexual harassment. See
Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
1847, 1853 (2018).
54. Id. at 1853-54.
55. Id. at 1854.
56. Lund, supra note 33, at 21.
57. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)).
58. Failure to hire and termination both constitute an adverse employment action.
59. Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC
Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer Jurisprudence, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 419, 446 (2014).
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jeopardize religious autonomy because a court would ultimately have to
decide what the accused religious organization really believes and how
important that belief is to the organization’s overall mission.60 This is
problematic because evaluating a religious organization’s beliefs can
violate the Establishment Clause.61
In most Title VII cases, courts engage in a pretext inquiry regarding the
employer’s stated legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.62
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that a plaintiff-minister who
asserts that a religious organization’s adverse employment action was
pretextual “misses the point of the ministerial exception.”63 Rather, “[t]he
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister . . . is the
church’s alone.”64
2. The Effect of Employment Division Department of Human Resources
v. Smith on the Ministerial Exception
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division Department
of Human Resources v. Smith,65 which limited the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause.66 In Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
is not a defense to those who violate neutral and generally applicable laws,
even when their actions are based on religious belief.67 Although some
questioned whether the ministerial exception would survive the strict
limitation on religious exemptions articulated in Smith, the D.C. Circuit
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America held that Smith did not modify
the ministerial exception.68 According to the court in Catholic University
of America, Smith implicated religious protection for individuals, not
religious organizations.69
Although Smith did not alter the ministerial exception, Smith still
implicated the exception because employment discrimination statutes are
almost always facially neutral and generally applicable.70 In response to
Smith, courts did not limit the ministerial exception, but rather expanded
the Establishment Clause, which shifted the focus from the religious
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 205-06 (2012).
Genova, supra note 59, at 443-44.
See Sterlinksi v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2019).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 174.
Id.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
West, supra note 1, at 1866.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
83 F.3d 455, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 462.
West, supra note 1, at 1866.
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organizations to the courts.71 Rather than concentrating on rights vested
in religious organizations, the focus shifted to the courts’ inherent
inability to decide religious questions.72 Smith does not impede a religious
organization’s ability to determine who is a minister because the
Establishment Clause—not the Free Exercise Clause—prevents courts’
involvement in religious matters.73
3. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC
In 2012, the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception for
the first time in Hosanna-Tabor.74 Prior to 2012, every federal circuit and
several state supreme courts had recognized the existence of the
ministerial exception,75 and most federal circuits had extended the
exception beyond merely heads of religious congregations.76 Although
the Supreme Court agreed that the ministerial exception existed, the Court
declined to adopt a “rigid formula” for deciding whether an employee
qualifies as a minister.77
In Hosanna-Tabor, the employee, Cheryl Perich, was a “called
teacher” and a “commissioned minister” at a Lutheran church and
school.78 Perich taught a religion class four days a week, led students in
daily prayer and devotional exercises, and attended a weekly school-wide
chapel service.79 After Perich took disability leave due to narcolepsy, the
church did not renew her contract.80 As a result, the EEOC sued HosannaTabor Church, alleging a violation of the ADA.81
Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Sixth Circuit held
that the employee was not a minister for the purposes of the exception.82
In overruling the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Court noted three errors
made by the lower court.83 First, the Sixth Circuit considered the
employee’s status of commissioned minister as immaterial to the
employee’s ministerial classification.84 Although an employee’s title by
itself does not automatically make someone a minister, an employee’s
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1866-67.
565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012).
Smith & Tuttle, supra note 53, at 1851.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 192-94.
Id. at 192-93.
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title, religious training, and mission underlying that title are all relevant.85
Second, the Court noted that the Sixth Circuit overemphasized the fact
that “lay” teachers at the school performed the same duties as the
employee.86 Finally, the Sixth Circuit overstated the substantial secular
duties that the employee performed.87 Because even heads of
congregations perform both religious and secular duties, the Court held
that this consideration was not determinative of the employee’s
classification.88
In deciding that Perich was a minister, the Court took a fact-based
approach that examined all the circumstances surrounding the
employment.89 Four considerations dominated the court’s analysis: (1)
the formal title that the church had bestowed on the employee; (2) the
substance reflected in the title; (3) the employee’s own use of the title;
and (4) the important religious functions that the employee performed.90
The Court rooted its decision in the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, although the Establishment Clause was more prevalent.91 The
Court justified the exception itself on the proposition that some questions
are outside the government’s authority to decide.92 Therefore, the
exception rests on the recognition that the government is specifically
limited in resolving certain ecclesiastical matters, not on a broad freedom
for religious organizations.93 Although the interests of the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause sometimes overlap, the
Establishment Clause imposes the primary justification for the ministerial
exception, as articulated by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor.94
i. Distinguishing Hosanna-Tabor from Smith
The Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor granted greater protection for
religious organizations than for religious individuals.95 The Court
distinguished its decision in Hosanna-Tabor from Smith by noting that a
religious organization’s selection of its ministers differs from an
individual’s ingestion of peyote.96 Specifically, Smith involved
85. Id. at 193.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 193-94.
89. Id. at 190.
90. Id. at 191-92.
91. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 53, at 1857.
92. Id. at 1862.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Carolina Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School
v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2011).
96. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
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government regulation of only outward physical acts while the
antidiscrimination employment laws implicated governmental
interference with an internal church decision that affected the faith and
mission of the church itself.97 Even the Court in Smith itself noted that the
government could regulate physical acts but could not empower “one or
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”98
ii. Concurring Opinions in Hosanna-Tabor
Justices Alito and Kagan concurred in Hosanna-Tabor, clarifying that
the term “minister” or the concept of ordination should not be viewed as
determining factors when classifying religious employees for purposes of
the exception.99 Rather, according to Justices Alito and Kagan, courts
should focus on the function performed by the employee.100 Further, the
Justices noted that the ministerial exception should be tailored to the
purpose of the First Amendment, which is to protect the key religious
activities of conducting religious rituals and communicating the
organization’s faith.101 Consequently, the Justices asserted that religious
organizations must be free to choose the personnel who are essential to
the performance of these functions.102
Justices Alito and Kagan also noted that the First Amendment allows
religious organizations to freely govern themselves according to their
own beliefs and to choose who may serve in positions of substantial
religious importance.103 While acknowledging the different views among
the different religions about what constitutes substantial religious
importance, Justices Alito and Kagan identified some general categories
of employees that are essential to almost every religious organization:
those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important
functions in worship services and religious ceremonies, and those who
teach the faith to others.104 The Justices explained that applying the
ministerial exception to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and
expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the
autonomy of any religious organization.105 The concurring opinion
emphasized that virtually every religious organization exists to
collectively express and propagate its religious ideals, and that the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
Id.
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character and conduct of the teachers can greatly affect the content and
credibility of a religion’s message.106
Additionally, Justices Alito and Kagan pointed out that several federal
circuits have reached a consensus that a functional approach should be
employed when applying the ministerial exception.107 Notably, their
concurring opinion emphasized that “[t]he Court’s opinion today should
not be read to upset this consensus.”108 Finally, the Justices’ main reason
for classifying the employee in Hosanna-Tabor as a minister was because
the employee played the essential role of “conveying the Church’s
message and carrying out its mission.”109
Justice Thomas separately concurred in Hosanna-Tabor, expressing
the view that courts should accept, without further inquiry, a religious
organizations’ sincere assertion about an employee’s status.110
Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that the courts should “defer to a
religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its
minister. . . . A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would
be hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the
organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’
under the organization’s theological tenets.”111 Further, Justice Thomas
argued that a religious organization should not have to conform its beliefs
and practices to the prevailing secular understanding of who should
qualify as a minister.112 Justice Thomas supported this argument by
quoting the Court’s decision in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos113: “[I]t is a
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of
substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will
consider religious.”114
4. After Hosanna-Tabor
Since 2012, several federal circuit courts have attempted to apply the
Hosanna-Tabor decision in cases involving the ministerial exception. For
example, the Fifth Circuit classified a Catholic church’s music director as
a minister because the director performed an important function during
the service and “played a role in furthering the mission of the church and
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 202-04.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 196-97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 197.
483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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conveying its message to congregants.”115 The Fifth Circuit supported
this classification by noting that the religious organization should be able
to determine who participates in its religious ceremonies.116
In a 2018 decision, Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, the
Seventh Circuit found that a Hebrew teacher qualified as a “minister” by
applying the fact-intensive analysis articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.117
Specifically, the court found that the teacher’s role in instructing the
students about Judaism, the school’s motivation for hiring her, and her
role in furthering the school’s religious mission demonstrated that the
Hebrew teacher was a “minister” of the religious organization.118
Applying the four considerations from Hosanna-Tabor, the court found
that the first factor—the teacher’s title—disfavored applying the
ministerial exception because the teacher was identified as a “grade
school teacher.”119 Second, the teacher’s use of her title disfavored the
use of the exception because the teacher never presented herself to the
public as an ambassador of Judaism.120 Third, the substance of the
teacher’s title favored applying the exception because the teacher
incorporated religious teachings into her lessons and the school hired her,
in part, because of her past religious teaching experience.121 Finally, the
teacher’s important religious function favored applying the exception.122
The teacher taught about the Jewish faith, conducted weekly Torah
readings, and prayed and performed certain rituals with her students.123
By looking at all the factors, the court found that the teacher’s
employment claim—based on her allegedly unlawful discriminatory
termination—must be dismissed due to her classification as a minister.124
5. Biel v. St. James School
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit decided Biel v. St. James School.125 In that
case, a fifth-grade teacher, Kristen Biel, at St. James Catholic School
informed the school that she had cancer and would have to take disability
leave.126 After the school failed to renew Biel’s contract, she sued,

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 180.
882 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 657.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 661-62.
911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 605.
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alleging an ADA violation.127 The Ninth Circuit held that the teacher was
not a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.128
Biel taught the fifth graders all of their academic subjects, including a
standard religion curriculum from a school-prescribed workbook on the
Catholic faith for about thirty minutes each day, four days a week.129 Biel
joined—but did not lead—her students in prayers twice a day.130 She also
attended monthly Mass with her students, where her “sole responsibility
was to keep her class quiet and orderly.”131
Biel’s contract specified that she would work within St. James’s
overriding commitment to Church doctrines, laws, and norms and would
“model, teach, and promote behavior in conformity to the teaching of the
Roman Catholic Church.”132 St. James’s mission statement stated that the
school strives to develop “confident, competent, and caring CatholicChristian citizens prepared to be responsible members of their church[,]
local[,] and global communities.”133 The school’s faculty handbook
provided that St. James’s teachers must participate in the Church’s
mission of educating students academically and in the Catholic faith and
values.134 Further, the handbook instructs teachers to follow both
archdiocesan curricula guidelines and California’s public-school
curricula requirements.135
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a religious organization’s broad
right to choose its own leaders, and that St. James indisputably qualified
as a religious organization.136 The only dispute was whether Biel should
be classified as a “minister” for the purposes of the exception.137 The
Ninth Circuit examined the four considerations that the Court had
discussed in Hosanna-Tabor and concluded that Biel was not a “minister”
for the purposes of the ministerial exception.138
First, Biel’s formal title did not suggest any special expertise in Church
doctrine, values, or pedagogy beyond that of a practicing Catholic.139 Her
title was “Grade 5 teacher,” which conveyed no religious meaning.140

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 606.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606-07.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608-10.
Id. at 608.
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8

218

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

Second, Biel had no ministerial background, and there was no religious
component to her educational degree or teaching credentials.141 Also, St.
James required no religious training for the position of fifth-grade
teacher.142 Even after Biel began work, her religious training was limited
to a single half-day conference that contained barely any religious
substance.143 Further, it appeared that Biel did not consider teaching at
the Catholic school to be a calling, but instead took work wherever she
could find it.144 For example, she had previously worked for a Lutheran
school, multiple public schools, and for tutoring companies.145
Third, Biel did not hold herself out to the public as a minister.146 She
called herself a teacher and did not claim any benefits available only to
ministers.147
Fourth, Biel’s job duties included teaching religion in the classroom.148
She incorporated religious themes and symbols into her overall classroom
environment and curriculum, as required by the school.149 Although Biel
likely satisfied this fourth consideration, the majority found that the
ministerial exception should not apply based on the satisfaction of one
factor alone.150 Otherwise, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, most of the
analysis in Hosanna-Tabor would be “irrelevant dicta,” given that the
employee’s didactic, religious role in Hosanna-Tabor was just one of four
considerations that the Court relied on when deciding that the employee
should be classified as a minister.151
The majority distinguished its holding in Biel from other postHosanna-Tabor sister circuit cases by noting that these other cases
involved employees with pronounced religious leadership and
guidance.152 Because Biel satisfied, at most, only one of the four
considerations, the majority found that Biel was not a minister for
purposes of the ministerial exception. 153
The majority also noted that a different holding would render any
school employee who teaches religion a minister for purposes of the

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610.
Id.
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exception.154 The majority asserted that such a rule would be unfaithful
to Hosanna-Tabor because “it would base the exception on a single aspect
of the employee’s role rather than on a holistic examination of her
training, duties, title, and the extent to which she is tasked with
transmitting religious ideas.”155
The majority concluded by considering the purpose of the First
Amendment and the Founders’ intent.156 Specifically, the majority noted
that the First Amendment does not exempt employees from federal
employment laws who do not “serve a leadership role in the faith” or those
employees who intermingle secular and religious duties.157 Rather,
Hosanna-Tabor protects those employees who “preach their employers’
beliefs, teach their faith, . . . carry out their mission . . . [and] guide their
religious organization on its way.”158
i. Judge Fisher’s Dissent in Biel v. St. James
Judge Fisher wrote a lengthy dissent that specified explained why Biel
should have been classified as a minister for the purposes of the
ministerial exception.159 Consistent with Hosanna-Tabor, the dissent
tried to get a “complete picture” of Biel’s role at St. James.160 For
example, the dissent examined Biel’s employment contract, a
performance review, and the faculty handbook.161 Also, Judge Fisher
thoroughly analyzed each of the four considerations discussed in
Hosanna-Tabor.162
In analyzing the considerations laid out in Hosanna-Tabor, the dissent
disputed the majority’s analysis as to only the second consideration—the
substance reflected in the job title.163 The dissent argued that the
substance reflected in a title is broader than mere educational or practical
prerequisites.164 Buttressing this argument, the dissent noted that a
broader interpretation encompasses certain religious organizations that do

154. Id. Interestingly, this result is exactly what Justices Alito and Kagan argued for in their
Hosanna-Tabor concurring opinion. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (“[The ‘ministerial’ exception] should apply to any ‘employee’ who . . . serves
as a messenger or teacher of [a religious organization’s] faith.”).
155. Biel, 911 F.3d at 610.
156. Id. at 610-11.
157. Id. at 611.
158. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196).
159. Id. (Fisher, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 612.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 615-20.
163. Id. at 616-18.
164. Id. at 616.
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not require formal training for their ministers.165 Judge Fisher argued that
this second factor should be evaluated based on how the religious
organization understood an employee’s role.166 Here, the religious
organization understood Biel’s role, as specified in her employment
contract, as one who would propagate and manifest the Catholic faith in
all aspects of teaching.167 Because the substance of Biel’s title as “Grade
5 Teacher” encompassed the role of religion teacher,168 Judge Fisher
argued that this factor favored classifying Biel as a minister for purposes
of the exception.169
The Biel dissent also mentioned Grussgott, in which the Seventh
Circuit held that the substance underlying the employee’s title favored
applying the exception to the Hebrew language teacher at a Jewish school,
partly because the substance of the teacher’s title, as communicated to her
and understood by others, entailed teaching the Jewish faith.170 Biel had
agreed in her contract that she understood that St. James’s mission was to
develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community within the
philosophy of Catholic education as implemented by St. James, and the
doctrines, law, and norms of the Catholic Church.171 For these reasons
and all the surrounding circumstances, Judge Fisher argued that Biel, like
the employee in Grussgott, should have been classified as a minister.172
6. Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru
In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court
noted that the four considerations in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant
circumstances in Perich’s case, not essential, inflexible requirements.173
Although the Court did not outright adopt the functional approach, the
Court noted that what matters when classifying an employee “is what an
employee does.”174 The Court held that other courts should decide
whether the first three Hosanna-Tabor circumstances—a ministerial
title, formal religious education, and the employee’s self-description as a
minister—were present.175 Then, to check the conclusion suggested by

165. Id. at 616-17.
166. Id. at 617.
167. Id.
168. In fact, Biel was the only religion teacher that the children had.
169. Biel, 911 F.3d at 617-18.
170. Id. at 617.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 621-22.
173
140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 2068.
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these circumstances, courts should ask whether the employee performed
a religious function.176

III. DISCUSSION
This Section will first explain why the approach used in Biel v. St.
James was inconsistent with the framework provided by the Supreme
Court in Hosanna-Tabor. Namely, the Biel court misclassified a religious
organization’s employee by requiring factual similarity between the Biel
employee and the Hosanna-Tabor employee. This approach is misguided
because courts should evaluate additional considerations—distinct from
the specific employment circumstances in Hosanna-Tabor— when
classifying employees. Additionally, such a holding could disadvantage
religious organizations that are unlike the religious organization in
Hosanna-Tabor. Next, this section will discuss how the Hosanna-Tabor
Court expanded the considerations that courts should evaluate when using
the functional approach to classify a religious organization’s employee.
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, most circuit courts used the functional approach
when classifying religious organization’s employees. But the functional
approach was limited to focusing on the employee’s job duties. In
Hosanna-Tabor, the Court examined all the circumstances surrounding
the employment when determining whether the employee functioned as a
minister, rather than solely considering the employee’s duties. Finally,
this section will conclude by explaining why this modified functional
approach comports with the purposes of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
A. In Biel v. St. James, when determining whether the plaintiff was a
“minister,” the Ninth Circuit evaluated only the four considerations
examined in Hosanna-Tabor rather than exploring all the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff’s employment.
In Biel v. St. James, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied the four
Hosanna-Tabor considerations—the employee’s formal title, the
substance underlying the title, the employee’s use of the title, and the
employee’s function—as factors that form a rigid test. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit found that the employee did not qualify as a minister
because “[a]t most, only one of the four Hosanna-Tabor considerations”
favored classifying the employee as such.177 However, in HosannaTabor, the Court explicitly rejected adopting a rigid test when classifying
176

Id.
177. Id. at 610.
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a religious organization’s employee for purposes of the ministerial
exception.178 By requiring that at least two of the Hosanna-Tabor
considerations be met before the ministerial exception may apply, the
court in Biel adopted a rigid test to classify the employee, which wholly
contradicted the holding in Hosanna-Tabor.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court did not refer to the employee’s formal title,
the substance underlying that title, the employee’s use of that title, or the
function performed by the employee as factors, but simply as
“considerations.” Nor did the Court state that these considerations
composed a multi-factor balancing analysis. In fact, in his concurring
opinion, Justice Thomas stated: “Judicial attempts to fashion a civil
definition of ‘minister’ through a bright-line test or multifactor analysis
risk disadvantaging those religious organizations whose beliefs, practices,
and membership are outside of the mainstream or unpalatable to some.”179
The considerations in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant for one specific
employee at a Lutheran church. In cases involving different types of
employees and different religious organizations, courts must analyze
different considerations when determining an employee’s ministerial
classification.
To illustrate, the considerations for an employee of a Buddhist
organization may drastically differ from those for an employee of a
Lutheran church. For example, an employee’s informal title, the
employee’s handbook or employment contract, the religious
organization’s mission, whether the employer’s hiring process included
religious criteria,180 and the religious organization’s expectation or
understanding of the employee’s role181 may all be relevant
considerations when classifying certain employees. The considerations
that are relevant to the classification of a religious organization’s
employees are endless due to the wide range of differing religious
organizations and the differing roles within each organization.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court did not begin with the four considerations
and discuss whether the employee satisfied each consideration. Rather,
the Court derived the considerations from a single employment
circumstance. Different considerations may have emerged if a different
type of employee or a different religious organization were at issue.
Additionally, Biel’s interpretation of Hosanna-Tabor inaccurately
conveyed that the ministerial exception applies only to cases that are
factually similar to Hosanna-Tabor. Specifically, the Biel court declined
to classify the employee as a minister because the case bore “so little
178.
179.
180.
181.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,173 (2012).
Id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999).
See Biel, 911 F.3d at 617 (Fisher, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/8

18

Ruwe: The Functional Approach to the Ministerial Exception

2020] THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

223

resemblance to Hosanna-Tabor.”182 This conclusion is misguided
because the Hosanna-Tabor Court never required factual similarity to
Perich’s circumstances in order for a court to classify an employee as a
minister. Rather, the Court narrowly held that the employee in HosannaTabor was a minister given all the circumstances of her individual
employment. This suggests that the correct approach for lower courts is
to first examine all the circumstances of the individual’s employment and
then determine whether the employee is a minister—that is, whether the
employee plays a role in preaching or teaching the organization’s beliefs
and carrying out its mission—based on the employee’s circumstances.
Even using the four Hosanna-Tabor considerations as general
guideposts approaches the question from the wrong direction. In
Hosanna-Tabor, the Court first examined the employee’s circumstances,
and then extracted the relevant considerations from those particular
circumstances. Although courts may still arrive at the correct holding,
courts that use the Hosanna-Tabor considerations as general guideposts
employ a misguided approach. For example, in Grussgott v. Milwaukee
Jewish Day School,183 the Seventh Circuit began its analysis for
classifying a Jewish school’s Hebrew teacher by examining each
Hosanna-Tabor consideration and considering the similarities between
the Jewish teacher and the Hosanna-Tabor employee.184 Because the
employee’s circumstances favored applying the exception, the Grussgott
court held that the Hebrew teacher qualified as a minister.185 Although
the court ultimately was correct in classifying the Hebrew teacher as a
minister, the court used a backwards approach to arrive at this holding.
B. Courts should employ a functional approach when determining the
classification of a religious organization’s employee.
Courts should use a functional approach when classifying a religious
organization’s employee for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in
Hosanna-Tabor essentially used a functional approach when applying the
ministerial exception, and lower courts should follow that lead. Second, a
functional approach facilitates the true purposes of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.
The functional approach focuses on the function performed by an
employee of a religious organization.186 Before Hosanna-Tabor was

182. Id. at 610.
183. 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018).
184. Id. at 659-60.
185. Id. at 662.
186. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012)
(Alito, J., concurring).
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decided, lower courts determined an employee to be a minister by
focusing mainly on the employee’s job duties—namely, if the employee’s
job duties consisted of “teaching, spreading the faith, church governance,
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship,” then the court determined that the employee
performed a religious function.187 Rather than focusing solely on the
employee’s job duties, the Hosanna-Tabor Court expanded the
considerations that courts should evaluate when using the functional
approach. Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the Court
considered whether the employee functioned to preach and teach the
religious organization’s belief and to carry out its mission.188 In
conclusion, when classifying a religious organization’s employees, courts
must first consider all the circumstances of the plaintiff’s employment.
Courts should then determine the plaintiff’s function from those
circumstances.
1. The Hosanna-Tabor Court considered all the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff’s employment to determine whether the
employee performed a religious function.
Although the majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor did not explicitly
adopt any formal test, each consideration that favored the Hosanna-Tabor
employee’s classification as a minister was simply a component of most
employees’ functions. The first consideration—an employee’s formal
title—generally describes an employee’s function. While there are
instances where an employee’s title may not relate to the employee’s
function, an employee’s job title and function generally do correlate. A
“title” can be defined as “a word or name that describes a person’s job in
a company or organization.”189 For example, the title of “medical
assistant” instantly conveys information about the function of such a
position—namely, to offer medical assistance to another. Similarly, the
title of “teacher” conveys a function of teaching and instructing,190 and
the title of “minister” conveys a function of ministering and serving.191
The second consideration—the substance underlying the title—is
necessary only when the employee performs some religious function. For
example, the employee in Hosanna-Tabor underwent significant religious

187. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).
188. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
189. Title, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/title.
190. “Teacher” is defined as “one whose occupation is to instruct.” Teacher, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/teacher.
191. “Minister” is defined as “to give aid or service.” Minister, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minister.
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training to obtain her position—she received an endorsement from her
local Synod district, passed an examination given by faculty at a Lutheran
college, and secured the congregation’s election.192 The Hosanna-Tabor
employee underwent such strenuous requirements because the
employee’s function was to preach and teach the organization’s beliefs to
others. Such demanding qualifications would have been unnecessary—
and even pointless—if the employee did not perform some religious
function.
The third consideration—the employee’s use of the title—pertains to
an employee’s function. The Hosanna-Tabor employee held herself out
to the public as a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service,
claiming a tax break available only to ministers, and indicating that she
regarded herself as a minister.193 When employees’ main functions are
“ministerial,” then such employees would likely hold themselves out to
the public as such. On the other hand, employees who perform very
limited “ministerial” functions would likely not hold themselves out to
the public as a minister. Indeed, it would be strange—and perceptually
even fraudulent—for employees to outwardly use their title as if they were
ministers if they performed no religious function.
The first three considerations in Hosanna-Tabor—the employee’s
formal title, the substance underlying that title, and the employee’s use of
that title—are related to the function that the employee performs. Indeed,
Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor noted
that majority’s opinion supported the functional approach: “The Court’s
opinion today should not be read to upset this [functional approach]
consensus.”194 And, while concurring opinions are not binding law, in
some instances, concurrences “may shape the evolution of the law as they
limit, expand, clarify, or contradict” the majority opinion.195 Sometimes,
the majority opinion does not contain a clear, easily-extractable legal
principle, and a concurring opinion can reveal the concurring justices’
“understanding of the majority opinion and their preferences regarding
the particular legal issue.”196 In some cases, lower courts may rely on
concurring opinions to understand how to apply the majority opinion to
192. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191.
193. Id. at 191-92.
194. Id. at 204 (Alito, J., concurring). Justices Alito and Kagan were referring to the consensus
reached by the lower courts that a religious organization’s employee’s ministerial classification should be
determined using a functional approach. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The ‘ministerial exception’ . . . does not depend upon ordination but
upon the function of the position”); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution . . . whose primary
functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.”)
195. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 5 (Robert
J. Spitzer ed., State University of New York Press 2010).
196. Id. at 6.
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their own cases.197
The Hosanna-Tabor majority opinion was cautious and vague. The
opinion gave the lower courts little guidance on how to apply the
ministerial exception. Instead of applying the four considerations as a
multi-factor balancing analysis—which explicitly contradicts Justice
Thomas’s position198—the lower courts should look to the concurring
opinions in Hosanna-Tabor as clarification of the majority opinion.199
Indeed, one can see reflections of the concurring opinions in the
majority’s opinion. For example, Justice Thomas argued that courts
should completely defer to a religious organization’s determination
regarding whether its employees qualify as ministers. This deference is
encompassed by the first consideration in Hosanna-Tabor—the
employee’s formal title. Because an employee’s formal title is entirely
decided by the religious organization, the Hosanna-Tabor Court
displayed the deference that Justice Thomas suggested by considering the
employee’s formal title as a circumstance that favored a ministerial
classification.
Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion was also incorporated
into the majority’s considerations. Specifically, Justices Alito and Kagan
argued that courts should focus on the function that the employee
performs. The Hosanna-Tabor Court explicitly incorporated the function
performed by the employee as the fourth consideration in determining that
the employee qualified as a minister.
2. A functional approach comports with the purposes of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
A functional approach to the ministerial exception facilitates three of
the purposes of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. First, a
religious organization must be free to shape its own faith and missions
through its appointments.200 Second, the Free Exercise Clause protects
genuine religious freedom, not pretextual or insincere beliefs.201 Third,
every religious organization—even nontraditional or unpopular ones—
197. Id. at 7.
198. Justice Thomas stated: “Judicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of ‘minister’ through a
bright-line test or multifactor analysis risk disadvantaging those religious organizations whose beliefs,
practices, and membership are outside of the mainstream or unpalatable to some.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
199. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has construed the concurring opinions in Hosanna-Tabor as
clarification of the majority’s opinion: “Justices Thomas and Alito each concurred separately to attempt
to elucidate the application of the ministerial exception.” Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d
169, 174 (5th Cir. 2012).
200. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
201. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
1159, 1162 (2013).
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must be protected.202 The purposes of the Free Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause would not be satisfied if the first three considerations in
Hosanna-Tabor were interpreted as separate factors of a test, rather than
simply as the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff’s employment.
i. A religious organization must be free to shape its own faith and
missions through its appointments.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prevents
governmental involvement in “a religious group’s right to shape its own
faith and mission through its appointments.”203 This overarching purpose
should be the backdrop against which courts consider whether an
employee qualifies as a minister. If the disputed employee plays a role in
shaping the religious organization’s faith or mission, the religious
organization should not have to follow antidiscrimination laws regarding
the employment. Because the function that an employee performs directly
relates to whether the employee has a role in shaping the religious
organization’s faith or mission, a functional approach to the ministerial
classification facilitates this purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
ii. The Free Exercise Clause protects sincere religious practices.
Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause protects sincere—not
pretextual—religious practices.204 If the first three considerations in
Hosanna-Tabor were interpreted as individual factors of a test, the
religious organization or the employee could unilaterally—and even
pretextually—satisfy those factors. For instance, a religious organization
could bestow a formal religious title on an employee or require significant
religious training underlying a formal title, simply as a pretense to satisfy
a factor of the ministerial classification analysis. Also, employees could
hold themselves out to the public as ministers, entirely for the purpose of
being classified as ministers—or vice versa. It is contrary to the aim of
the ministerial exception for religious organizations to invoke a
ministerial classification, or for religious organizations’ employees to
avoid a ministerial classification, through a spurious, backdoor approach.
Rather, the ministerial exception should apply only to the employees of a
religious organizations who can genuinely be classified as “ministers.
Additionally, religious organizations should not be forced to comport
with a rigid framework in order to invoke the ministerial exception.
202. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
203. 565 U.S. at 173.
204. Paulsen, supra note 197, at 1162.
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Specifically, religious organizations should not be obligated to confer a
formal title on their ministers, to impose some substance underlying those
formal titles, or to compel their ministers to hold themselves out to the
public as ministers. Rather, the classification of religious organizations’
employees should be flexibly based on the naturally occurring, genuine
circumstances surrounding their employment.
iii. The Establishment Clause prevents the government from
disadvantaging nontraditional religious organizations.
Finally, the Establishment Clause should operate to avoid
disadvantaging obscure and nontraditional religious organizations.205 The
functional approach accomplishes this purpose while the four-factor
analysis applied by Biel does not. If the first consideration in HosannaTabor—an employee’s formal title—was interpreted as the first factor of
a multi-factor analysis, that factor would disadvantage nontraditional
religious organizations. Whether a formal title implies that an employee
is a “minister” will differ depending on the religious organization. Even
though “teacher” is a facially secular title, some religious organizations
use such titles for their minsters. For example, in the Mormon church, the
formal title of “teacher” can refer to an office in the church’s
Priesthood.206 Additionally, some religious organizations bestow formal
titles on their ministers while other religious organizations eschew such
titles entirely. Similarly, the second consideration in Hosanna-Tabor—
the substance reflected in that title—would disadvantage those religious
organizations who do not train or recognize a mission underlying their
ministers’ titles. Finally, the third consideration—whether the employees
hold themselves out to the public as a minister—could disadvantage those
organizations that do not allow their ministers to publicly benefit from
their ministerial status.
The functional analysis accommodates nontraditional and obscure
religious organizations. Justices Alito and Kagan identified some general
functions that are essential to virtually every religious organization,
however diverse.207 Those religious functions include serving in positions
of leadership, performing important functions in worship services and
religious ceremonies, and conveying the religious organization’s faith.208
Because such functions are imperative to virtually every religious
organization, classifying employees who perform those functions as
205. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244 (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”)
206. Teachers, MORMONWIKI (Sept. 1, 2010), https://www.mormonwiki.com/Teachers.
207. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
208. Id.
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“ministers” will not disadvantage nontraditional or obscure religious
organizations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under a functional approach to the ministerial exception, all teachers
employed by a religious organization who convey an organization’s
beliefs should be classified as “ministers.” Justices Alito and Kagan’s
concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor stated that the First Amendment
enables religious organizations to engage in the “critical process of
communicating the faith.”209 Further, the Justices argued that the
ministerial exception should apply to any employee who “serves as a
messenger or teacher” of a religious organization’s faith.210 Additionally,
the Justices noted that conveying the faith to the next generation is an
essential function to the freedom of practically all religious organizations,
and that the messenger certainly matters when it comes to the inculcation
of religious doctrine because the credibility of a religion’s message often
depends on the character and conduct of its teachers.211
Recently, a study was conducted to investigate the influences on
students’ values in the academic setting.212 The study examined whether,
during a semester, university students’ values were influenced by their
professors’ values.213 At the beginning and again at the end of the
semester, students answered a questionnaire surveying their religious and
political preferences.214
The study found that, during the semester, the students assimilated their
values to their professors’ values for values-based215 classes.216 Most
notably, the study revealed that professors’ impact on students’ religiosity
was the most consistent and robust finding.217 Specifically, the more the
professors valued religion, the more the students valued religion.218
Conversely, if the professors did not value religion, then the students’
209. Id. at 199.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 200-01.
212. Glory Emmanuel-Aviña & Harold D. Delaney, The Value Assimilation Effect Between
University Professors and Their Students in the Classroom, 7 J. OF CURRICULUM & TEACHING 158, 158
(2018).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 161-62.
215. In this study, a values-based class meant that “the purpose of the course was to discuss valuesbased topics (e.g., human rights, spiritual beliefs).” Id. at 164. A “value” was defined as “internalized
cognitive structure that guides decision making by establishing basic principles of right and wrong, a sense
of priorities, meaning, and patterns.” Id. at 158.
216. Id. at 158.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 181.
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value of religion decreased.219 In sum, the magnitude and direction of
change in the students’ values were influenced by their professor’s level
of religiosity.220
The findings of this study bolster the points made in Justices Alito and
Kagan’s concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. The study suggests that
if a religious organization employs a teacher to convey its beliefs, the
teacher’s effectiveness in imparting the organization’s values depends, at
least in part, on the teacher’s own values. A religious organization
possesses a critical interest in effectively imparting the organization’s
beliefs to others. Therefore, to preserve complete religious freedom, all
religious teachers should qualify as “ministers” for purposes of the
exception.
Additionally, the study revealed that students assimilated their values
to their professors’ values for non-values-based221 classes, too.222
Although Justices Alito and Kagan’s concurring opinion in HosannaTabor stated that “a purely secular teacher would not qualify” for the
ministerial exception,223 the study’s finding suggests that a teacher who
teaches nonreligious subjects at a religious organization’s school might
qualify as a minister for purposes of the exception. Perhaps as new studies
come out and demonstrate the effect that every teacher has on students’
religious values, the analysis might change on that front.
The Supreme Court caused unnecessary confusion by issuing an
extremely narrow and undefined holding in Hosanna-Tabor—the only
case the Supreme Court has ever heard involving the ministerial
exception. Religious organizations and their employees deserve
predictability and certainty regarding liability for adverse employment
decisions. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt any rigid
test, the functional approach is consistent with the Court’s holding in
Hosanna-Tabor and comports with the purposes of the First Amendment.
Therefore, lower courts should use a functional analysis when classifying
religious organizations’ employees for the purposes of the ministerial
exception.

219. Id.
220. Id. at 158.
221. For the purposes of the study, a non-values-based class meant that “the purpose of the course
was to learn a defined set of information (e.g., formulas, facts, methods).” Id. at 164.
222. Id. at 158.
223. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S 171,204 (2012)
(Alito, J., concurring).
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